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Abstract. Randomness extraction is of fundamental importance for
information-theoretic cryptography. It allows to transform a raw key
about which an attacker has some limited knowledge into a fully se-
cure random key, on which the attacker has essentially no information.
Up to date, only very few randomness-extraction techniques are known
to work against an attacker holding quantum information on the raw
key. This is very much in contrast to the classical (non-quantum) set-
ting, which is much better understood and for which a vast amount of
different techniques are known and proven to work.
We prove a new randomness-extraction technique, which is known to
work in the classical setting, to be secure against a quantum attacker as
well. Randomness extraction is done by xor’ing a so-called δ-biased mask
to the raw key. Our result allows to extend the classical applications of
this extractor to the quantum setting. We discuss the following two ap-
plications. We show how to encrypt a long message with a short key,
information-theoretically secure against a quantum attacker, provided
that the attacker has enough quantum uncertainty on the message. This
generalizes the concept of entropically-secure encryption to the case of
a quantum attacker. As second application, we show how to do error-
correction without leaking partial information to a quantum attacker.
Such a technique is useful in settings where the raw key may contain er-
rors, since standard error-correction techniques may provide the attacker
with information on, say, a secret key that was used to obtain the raw
key.
1 Introduction
Randomness extraction allows to transform a raw keyX about which an attacker
has some limited knowledge into a fully secure random key S. It is required that
the attacker has essentially no information on the resulting random key S, no
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matter what kind of information he has about the raw key X , as long as his
uncertainty on X is lower bounded in terms of a suitable entropy measure. One
distinguishes between extractors which use a private seed (preferably as small
as possible) [29], and, what is nowadays called strong extractors, which only use
public coins [15,21]. In the context of cryptography, the latter kind of random-
ness extraction is also known as privacy amplification [5]. Randomness-extraction
techniques play an important role in various areas of theoretical computer sci-
ence. In cryptography, they are at the core of many constructions in information-
theoretic cryptography, but they also proved to be useful in the computational
setting. As such, there is a huge amount of literature on randomness extraction,
and there exist various techniques which are optimized with respect to different
needs; we refer to Shaltiel’s survey [26] for an informative overview on classical
and recent results.
Most of these techniques, however, are only guaranteed to work in a non-
quantum setting, where information is formalized by means of classical infor-
mation theory. In a quantum setting, where the attacker’s information is given
by a quantum state, our current understanding is much more deflating. Renner
and Ko¨nig [23] have shown that privacy amplification via universal2 hashing is
secure against quantum adversaries. And, Ko¨nig and Terhal [18] showed secu-
rity against quantum attackers for certain extractors, namely for one-bit-output
strong extractors, as well as for strong extractors which work by extracting bit
wise via one-bit-output strong extractors. Concurrent to our work, Smith has
shown recently that Renner and Ko¨nig’s result generalizes to almost-universal
hashing, i.e., that Srinivasan-Zuckerman extractors remain secure against quan-
tum adversaries [27]. On the negative side, Gavinsky et al. recently showed that
there exist (strong) extractors that are secure against classical attackers, but
which become completely insecure against quantum attackers [13]. Hence, it is
not only a matter of lack of proof, but in fact classical extractors may turn
insecure when considering quantum attackers.
We prove a new randomness-extraction technique to be secure against a
quantum attacker. It is based on the concept of small-biased spaces, see e.g. [20].
Concretely, randomness extraction is done by xor’ing the raw key X ∈ {0, 1}n
with a δ-biased mask A ∈ {0, 1}n, chosen privately according to some specific
distribution, where the distribution may be chosen publicly from some family
of distributions. Roughly, A (or actually the family of distributions) is δ-biased,
if any non-trivial parity of A can only be guessed with advantage δ. We prove
that if A is δ-biased, then the bit-wise xor X ⊕ A is ε-close to random and
independent of the attacker’s quantum state with ε = δ · 2(n−t)/2, where t is the
attacker’s quantum collision-entropy in X . Thus, writing δ = 2−κ, the extracted
key X ⊕A is essentially random as long as 2κ is significantly larger than n− t.
Note that in its generic form, this randomness extractor uses public coins, namely
the choice of the distribution, and a private seed, the sampling of A according
to the chosen distribution. Specific instantiations though, may lead to standard
extractors with no public coins (as in Section 5), or to a strong extractor with no
private seed (as in Section 6). The proof of the new randomness-extraction result
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combines quantum-information-theoretic techniques developed by Renner [22,23]
and techniques from Fourier analysis, similar to though slightly more involved
than those used in [2].
We would like to point out that the particular extractor we consider, δ-biased
masking, is well known to be secure against non-quantum attackers. Indeed,
classical security was shown by Dodis and Smith, who also suggested useful
applications [11,12]. Thus, our main contribution is the security analysis in the
presence of a quantum attacker. Our positive result not only contributes to the
general problem of the security of extractors against quantum attacks, but it
is particularly useful in combination with the classical applications of δ-biased
masking where it leads to interesting new results in the quantum setting. We
discuss these applications and the arising new results below.
The first application is entropically secure encryption [25,12]. An encryption
scheme is entropically secure if the ciphertext gives essentially no information
away on the plaintext (in an information-theoretic sense), provided that the at-
tacker’s a priori information on the plaintext is limited. Entropic security allows
to overcome Shannon’s pessimistic result on the size of the key for information-
theoretically secure encryption, in that a key of size essentially ℓ ≈ n− t suffices
to encrypt a plaintext of size n which has t bits of entropy given the attacker’s
a priori information. This key size was known to suffice for a non-quantum ad-
versary [25,12]. By our analysis, this result carries over to the setting where
we allow the attacker to store information as quantum states: a key of size es-
sentially ℓ ≈ n − t suffices to encrypt a plaintext of size n which has t bits of
(min- or collision-) entropy given the attacker’s quantum information about the
plaintext.
Note that entropic security in a quantum setting was also considered explic-
itly in [8] and implicitly for the task of approximate quantum encryption [2,16,10].
However, all these results are on encrypting a quantum message into a quantum
ciphertext on which the attacker has limited classical information (or none at
all), whereas we consider encrypting a classical message into a classical cipher-
text on which the attacker has limited quantum information. Thus, our result in
quantum entropic security is in that sense orthogonal. As a matter of fact, the re-
sults in [2,16,10,8] about randomizing quantum states can also be appreciated as
extracting “quantum randomness” from a quantum state on which the attacker
has limited classical information. Again, this is orthogonal to our randomness-
extraction result which allows to extract classical randomness from a classical
string on which the attacker has limited quantum information. In independent
recent work, Desrosiers and Dupuis showed that one can combine techniques to
get the best out of both: they showed that δ-biased masking (as used in [2])
allows to extract “quantum randomness” from a quantum state on which the
attacker has limited quantum information. This in particular implies our result.
The second application is in the context of private error-correction. Consider
a situation where the raw key X is obtained by Alice and Bob with the help of
some (short) common secret key K, and where the attacker Eve, who does not
know K, has high entropy on X . Assume that, due to noise, Bob’s version of the
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raw key X ′ is slightly different from Alice’s version X . Such a situation may for
instance occur in the bounded-storage model or in a quantum-key-distribution
setting. Since Alice and Bob have different versions of the raw key, they first
need to correct the errors before they can extract (by means of randomness
extraction) a secure key S from X . However, since X and X ′ depend on K,
standard techniques for correcting the errors between X and X ′ leak information
not only on X but also on K to Eve, which prohibits that Alice and Bob can re-
useK in a future session. In the case of a non-quantum attacker, Dodis and Smith
showed how to do error-correction in such a setting without leaking information
on K to Eve [11], and thus that K can be safely re-used an unlimited number
of times. We show how our randomness-extraction result gives rise to a similar
way of doing error correction without leaking information on K, even if Eve
holds her partial information on X in a quantum state. Such a private-error-
correction technique is a useful tool in various information-theoretic settings
with a quantum adversary. Very specifically, this technique has already been
used as essential ingredient to derive new results in the bounded-(quantum)-
storage model and in quantum key distribution [7].
The paper is organized as follows. We start with some quantum-information-
theoretic notation and definitions. The new randomness-extraction result is pre-
sented in Section 3 and proven in Section 4. The two applications discussed are
given in Sections 5 and 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Terminology
A quantum system is described by a complex Hilbert space HA (in this paper
always of finite dimension). The state of the system is given by a density matrix:
a positive semi-definite operator ρA on HA with trace tr(ρA) = 1. We write
P(HA) for the set of all positive semi-definite operators on HA, and we call
ρA ∈ P(HA) normalized if it has trace 1, i.e., if it is a density matrix. For a
density matrix ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) of a composite quantum system HA ⊗HB,
we write ρB = trA(ρAB) for the state obtained by tracing out system HA. A
density matrix ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) is called classical on HX with X ∈ X , if
it is of the form ρXB =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB with normalized ρxB ∈ P(HB),
where {|x〉}x∈X forms an orthonormal basis of HX . Such a density matrix ρXB
which is classical on HX can be viewed as a random variable X with distribution
PX together with a family {ρxB}x∈X of conditional density matrices, such that
the state of HB is given by ρxB if and only if X takes on the value x. We can
introduce a new random variable Y which is obtained by “processing”X , i.e., by
extending the distribution PX to a consistent joint distribution PXY . Doing so
then naturally defines the density matrix ρXYB =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x|⊗|y〉〈y|⊗
ρxB, and thus also the density matrix ρY B = trX(ρXYB) =
∑
y PY (y)|y〉〈y| ⊗(∑
x PX|Y (x|y)ρxB
)
. If the meaning is clear from the context, we tend to slightly
abuse notation and write the latter also as ρY B =
∑
y PY (y)|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyB, i.e.,
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understand ρyB as
∑
x PX|Y (x|y)ρxB. Throughout, we write 1 for the identity
matrix of appropriate dimension.
2.2 Distance and Entropy Measures for Quantum States
We recall some definitions from [22]. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB). Although the
following definitions make sense (and are defined in [22]) for arbitrary ρXB, we
may assume ρXB to be normalized
1 and to be classical on HX .
Definition 2.1. The L1-distance from uniform of ρXB given B is defined by
d(ρXB|B) := ‖ρXB − ρU ⊗ ρB‖1 = tr
(|ρXB − ρU ⊗ ρB|)
where ρU :=
1
dim(HX )
1 is the fully mixed state on HX and |A| :=
√
A†A is the
positive square root of A†A (where A† is the complex-conjugate transpose of A).
If ρXB is classical on HX , then d(ρXB|B) = 0 if and only if X is uniformly
distributed and ρxB does not depend on x, which in particular implies that
no information on X can be learned by observing system HB. Furthermore, if
d(ρXB |B) ≤ ε then the real system ρXB “behaves” as the ideal system ρU ⊗ ρB
except with probability ε in that for any evolution of the system no observer can
distinguish the real from the ideal one with advantage greater than ε [23].
Definition 2.2. The collision-entropy and the min-entropy of ρXB relative to
a normalized and invertible σB ∈ P(HB) are defined by
H2(ρXB|σB) := − log tr
((
(1⊗ σ−1/4B ) ρXB (1⊗ σ−1/4B )
)2)
= − log
∑
x
PX(x)
2 tr
((
σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
B σ
−1/4
B
)2)
and
H∞(ρXB|σB) := − logλmax
(
(1⊗ σ−1/2B ) ρXB (1⊗ σ−1/2B )
)
= − logmax
x
λmax
(
PX(x) σ
−1/2
B ρ
x
B σ
−1/2
B
)
,
respectively, where λmax(·) denotes the largest eigenvalue of the argument. The
collision-entropy and the min-entropy of ρXB given HB are defined by
H2(ρXB|B) := sup
σB
H2(ρXB|σB) and H∞(ρXB|B) := sup
σB
H∞(ρXB |σB)
respectively, where the supremum ranges over all normalized σB ∈ P(HB).
1 For a non-normalized ρXB, there is a normalizing 1/ tr(ρXB)-factor in the definition
of collision-entropy. Also note that tr(σ−1/2ρσ−1/2) = tr(ρσ−1) for any invertible σ.
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Note that without loss of generality, the supremum over σB can be restricted
to the set of normalized and invertible states σB which is dense in the set of
normalized states in P(HB). Note furthermore that it is not clear, neither in
the classical nor in the quantum case, what the “right” way to define condi-
tional collision- or min-entropy is, and as a matter of fact, it depends on the
context which version serves best. An alternative way to define the collision-
and min-entropy of ρXB given HB would be as H˜2(ρXB |B) := H2(ρXB |ρB) and
H˜∞(ρXB|B) := H∞(ρXB|ρB). For a density matrix ρXY that is classical on HX
and HY , it is easy to see that H˜2(ρXY |Y ) = − log
∑
y PY (y)
∑
x PX|Y (x|y)2,
i.e., the negative logarithm of the average conditional collision probability, and
H˜∞(ρXY |Y ) = − logmaxx,y PX|Y (x|y), i.e., the negative logarithm of the maxi-
mal conditional guessing probability. These notions of classical conditional collision-
and min-entropy are commonly used in the literature, explicitly (see e.g. [24,6])
or implicitly (as e.g. in [5]). We stick to Definition 2.2 because it leads to stronger
results, in that asking H2(ρXB|B) to be large is a weaker requirement than ask-
ing H˜2(ρXB |B) to be large, as obviously H2(ρXB |B) ≥ H˜2(ρXB |B), and similarly
for the min-entropy.
3 The New Randomness-Extraction Result
We start by recalling the definition of a δ-biased random variable and of a δ-
biased family of random variables [20,11].
Definition 3.1. The bias of a random variable A, with respect to α ∈ {0, 1}n,
is defined as
biasα(A) :=
∑
a
PA(a)(−1)α·a = 2
(
P [α·A=1]− 12
)
,
and A is called δ-biased if biasα(A) ≤ δ for all non-zero α ∈ {0, 1}n. A family
of random variables {Ai}i∈I over {0, 1}n is called δ-biased if, for all α 6= 0,√
Ei←I
[
biasα(Ai)2
] ≤ δ
where the expectation is over a i chosen uniformly at random from I.
Note that by Jensen’s inequality, Ei←I [biasα(Ai)] ≤ δ for all non-zero α is
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for {Ai}i∈I to be δ-biased. In case
though the family consists of only one member, then it is δ-biased if and only if
its only member is.
Our main theorem states that if {Ai}i∈I is δ-biased for a small δ, and if
an adversary’s conditional entropy H2(ρXB|B) on a string X ∈ {0, 1}n is large
enough, then masking X with Ai for a random but known i gives an essentially
random string.
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Theorem 3.2. Let the density matrix ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗HB) be classical on HX
with X ∈ {0, 1}n. Let {Ai}i∈I be a δ-biased family of random variables over
{0, 1}n, and let I be uniformly and independently distributed over I. Then
d
(
ρ(AI⊕X)BI
∣∣BI) ≤ δ · 2− 12 (H2(ρXB |B)−n).
By the inequalities
H∞(X)− log dim(HB) ≤ H∞(ρXB|B) ≤ H2(ρXB|B) ,
proven in [22], Theorem 3.2 may also be expressed in terms of conditional min-
entropy H∞(ρXB|B) or in terms of classical min-entropy of X minus the size
of the quantum state (i.e. the number of qubits). If B is the “empty” quantum
state, i.e., log dim(HB) = 0, then Theorem 3.2 coincides with Lemma 4 of [11].
Theorem 3.2 also holds, with a corresponding normalization factor, for non-
normalized operators, from which it follows that it can also be expressed in
terms of the smooth conditional min-entropy Hε∞(ρXB|B), as defined in [22], as
d(ρ(AI⊕X)BI |BI) ≤ 2ε+ δ · 2−
1
2 (H
ε
∞
(ρXB |B)−n).
4 The Proof
We start by pointing out some elementary observations regarding the Fourier
transform over the hypercube. In particular, we can extend the Convolution
theorem and Parseval’s identity to the case of matrix-valued functions. Further
properties of the Fourier transform (with a different normalization) of matrix-
valued functions over the hypercube have recently been established by Ben-
Aron, Regev and de Wolf [4]. In Section 4.2, we introduce and recall a couple of
properties of the L2-distance from uniform. The actual proof of Theorem 3.2 is
given in Section 4.3.
4.1 Fourier Transform and Convolution
For some fixed positive integer d, consider the complex vector space MF of
all functions M : {0, 1}n → Cd×d. The convolution of two such matrix-valued
functions M,N ∈MF is the matrix-valued function
M ∗N : x 7→
∑
y
M(y)N(x− y)
and the Fourier transform of a matrix-valued function M ∈MF is the matrix-
valued function
F(M) : α 7→ 2−n/2
∑
x
(−1)α·xM(x)
where α · x denotes the standard inner product modulo 2. Note that if X is
a random variable with distribution PX and M is the matrix-valued function
x 7→ PX(x) · 1, then
F(M)(α) = 2−n/2 · biasα(X) · 1 .
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The Euclidean or L2-norm of a matrix-valued function M ∈MF is given by
|||M |||2 :=
√
tr
(∑
x
M(x)†M(x)
)
where M(x)† denotes the complex-conjugate transpose of the matrix M(x).2
The following two properties known as Convolution Theorem and Parseval’s
Theorem are straightforward to prove (see Appendix A).
Lemma 4.1. For all M,N ∈ MF :
F(M ∗N) = 2n/2 · F(M) · F(N) and |||F(M)|||2 = |||M |||2 .
4.2 The L2-Distance from Uniform
The following lemmas together with their proofs can be found in [22]. Again,
we restrict ourselves to the case where ρXB and σB are normalized and ρXB is
classical on X , whereas the claims hold (partly) more generally.
Definition 4.2. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) and σB ∈ P(HB). Then the condi-
tional L2-distance from uniform of ρXB relative to σB is
d2(ρXB|σB) := tr
((
(1⊗ σ−1/4B )(ρXB − ρU ⊗ ρB)(1 ⊗ σ−1/4B )
)2)
,
where ρU :=
1
dim(HX )
1 is the fully mixed state on HX .
Lemma 4.3. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX⊗HB). Then, for any normalized σB ∈ P(HB),
d(ρXB|B) ≤
√
dim(HX)
√
d2(ρXB|σB).
Lemma 4.4. Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗HB) be classical on HX with X ∈ X , and let
ρxB be the corresponding normalized conditional operators. Then, for any σB ∈
P(HB)
d2(ρXB |σB) =
∑
x
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B PX(x)ρ
x
Bσ
−1/4
B )
2
)
− 1|X | tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρBσ
−1/4
B )
2
)
.
4.3 Proof Theorem 3.2
Write Di = Ai ⊕ X and DI = AI ⊕ X . Since ρDIBI = 1|I|
∑
i ρ
i
DIB
⊗ |i〉〈i| =
1
|I|
∑
i ρDiB ⊗ |i〉〈i|, and similar for ρBI , it follows that the L1-distance from
uniform can be written as an expectation over the random choice of i from I.
Indeed
d(ρDIBI |BI) =
1
|I| tr
(∣∣∣∑
i
(ρDiB − ρU ⊗ ρB)⊗ |i〉〈i|
∣∣∣)
2 We will only deal with Hermitian matrices M(x) where |||M |||2 =
q
tr
`P
xM(x)
2
´
.
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=
1
|I|
∑
i
tr
(∣∣ρDiB − ρU ⊗ ρB∣∣) = 1|I|
∑
i
d(ρDiB|B) = Ei←I
[
d(ρDiB|B)
]
.
where the second equality follows from the block-diagonal form of the matrix.
With Lemma 4.3, the term in the expectation can be bounded in terms of the
L2-distance from uniform, that is, for any normalized σB ∈ P(HB),
d(ρDIBI |BI) ≤
√
2n Ei←I
[√
d2(ρDiB|σB)
]
≤ 2n/2
√
Ei←I
[
d2(ρDiB|σB)
]
where the second inequality is Jensen’s inequality. By Lemma 4.4, we have for
the L2-distance
d2(ρDiB|σB)
= tr
(∑
d
(σ
−1/4
B PDi(d)ρ
d
B σ
−1/4
B )
2
)
− 1
2n
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρB σ
−1/4
B )
2
)
.
(1)
Note that
PDi(d)ρ
d
B = PDi(d)
∑
x
PX|Di(x|d)ρxB =
∑
x
PXDi(x, d)ρ
x
B
=
∑
x
PXAi(x, d ⊕ x)ρxB =
∑
x
PX(x)PAi (d⊕ x)ρxB
so that the first term on the right-hand side of (1) can be written as
tr
(∑
d
(σ
−1/4
B PDi(d)ρ
d
B σ
−1/4
B )
2
)
= tr
(∑
d
(∑
x
PX(x)σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
B σ
−1/4
B PAi(d⊕ x)
)2)
.
The crucial observation now is that the term that is squared on the right side is
the convolution of the two matrix-valued functionsM : x 7→ PX(x)σ−1/4B ρxBσ−1/4B
and N : x 7→ PAi(x)1, and the whole expression equals |||M ∗N |||22. Thus, using
Lemma 4.1 we get
tr
(∑
d
(σ
−1/4
B PDi(d)ρ
d
B σ
−1/4
B )
2
)
= |||M ∗N |||22 = |||F(M ∗N)|||22
= |||2n/2 · F(M) · F(N)|||22 = 2n tr
(∑
α
(
F(M)(α)F(N)(α)
)2)
=
1
2n
tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρB σ
−1/4
B )
2
)
+ tr

∑
α6=0
F(M)(α)2 biasα(Ai)
2

 ,
(2)
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where the last equality uses
F(M)(0) = 2−n/2
∑
x
PX(x)σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
B σ
−1/4
B = 2
−n/2σ
−1/4
B ρB σ
−1/4
B
as well as
F(N)(0) = 2−n/2
∑
x
PAi(x)1 = 2
−n/2
1 and F(N)(α) = 2−n/2 · biasα(Ai)1 .
Substituting (2) into (1) gives
d2(ρDiB|σB) = tr

∑
α6=0
F(M)(α)2 biasα(Ai)
2

 .
Using the linearity of the expectation and trace, and using the bound on the
expected square-bias, we get
Ei←I
[
d2(ρDiB|σB)
] ≤ δ2 tr(∑
α6=0
F(M)(α)2
)
≤ δ2 tr
(∑
α
F(M)(α)2
)
= δ2|||F(M)|||22 = δ2|||M |||22 = δ2
∑
x
tr
(
PX(x)
2(σ
−1/4
B ρ
x
B σ
−1/4
B )
2
)
= δ22−H2(ρXB |σB) ,
where the second inequality follows because of
tr
(
F(M)(0)2
)
= 2−n tr
(
(σ
−1/4
B ρB σ
−1/4
B )
2
) ≥ 0 .
Therefore,
d(ρDIBI |BI) ≤ 2n/2
√
Ei←I
[
d2(ρDiB|σB)
] ≤ δ · 2− 12 (H2(ρXB |σB)−n)
and the assertion follows from the definition of H2(ρXB|B) because σB was
arbitrary. ⊓⊔
5 Application I: Entropic Security
Entropic security is a relaxed but still meaningful security definition for (information-
theoretically secure) encryption that allows to circumvent Shannon’s pessimistic
result, which states that any perfectly secure encryption scheme requires a key
at least as long as the message to be encrypted. Entropic security was introduced
by Russell and Wang [25], and later more intensively investigated by Dodis and
Smith [12]. Based on our result, and in combination with techniques from [12],
we show how to achieve entropic security against quantum adversaries. We would
like to stress that in contrast to perfect security e.g. when using the one-time-
pad, entropic security does not a priori protect against a quantum adversary.
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Informally, entropic security is defined as follows. An encryption scheme is
entropically secure if no adversary can obtain any information on the messageM
from its ciphertext C (in addition to what she can learn from scratch), provided
the message M has enough uncertainty from the adversary’s point of view. The
impossibility of obtaining any information on M is formalized by requiring that
any adversary that can compute f(M) for some function f when given C, can
also compute f(M) without C (with similar success probability). A different
formulation, which is named indistinguishability, is to require that there exists
a random variable C′, independent of M , such that C and C′ are essentially
identically distributed. It is shown in [12], and in [8] for the case of a quantum
message, that the two notions are equivalent if the adversary’s information on
M is classical. In recent work, Desrosiers and Dupuis proved this equivalence to
hold also for an adversary with quantum information [9].
The adversary’s uncertainty on M is formalized, for a classical (i.e. non-
quantum) adversary, by the min-entropy H∞(M |V = v) (or, alternatively, the
collision-entropy) ofM , conditioned on the value v the adversary’s view V takes
on. We formalize this uncertainty for a quantum adversary in terms of the quan-
tum version of conditional min- or actually collision-entropy, as introduced in
Section 2.2.
Definition 5.1. We call a (possibly randomized) encryption scheme E : K ×
M → C (t, ε)-quantum-indistinguishable if there exists a random variable C′
over C such that for any normalized ρMB ∈ P(HM ⊗HB) which is classical on
HM with M ∈M and H2(ρMB |B) ≥ t, we have that∥∥ρE(K,M)B − ρC′ ⊗ ρB∥∥1 ≤ ε ,
where K is uniformly and independently distributed over K.
Note that in case of an “empty” state B, our definition coincides with the indis-
tinguishability definition from [12] (except that we express it in collision- rather
than min-entropy).
Theorem 3.2, with I = {i◦} and Ai◦ = K, immediately gives a generic
construction for a quantum-indistinguishable encryption scheme (with C′ being
uniformly distributed). Independently, this result was also obtained in [9].
Theorem 5.2. Let K ⊆ {0, 1}n be such that the uniform distribution K over
K is δ-biased. Then the encryption scheme E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n with
E(k,m) = k ⊕m is (t, ε)-quantum-indistinguishable with ε = δ · 2n−t2 .
Alon et al. [1] showed how to construct subsets K ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |K| =
O(n2/δ2) such that the uniform distribution K over K is δ-biased and elements
in K can be efficiently sampled. With the help of this construction, we get the
following result, which generalizes the bound on the key-size obtained in [12] to
the quantum setting.
Corollary 5.3. For any ε ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ n, there exists a (t, ε)-quantum-
indistinguishable encryption scheme encrypting n-bit messages with key length
ℓ = log |K| = n− t+ 2 log(n) + 2 log(1ε ) +O(1).
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In the language of extractors, defining a (t, ε)-quantum extractor in the natural
way as follows, Corollary 5.3 translates to Corollary 5.5 below.
Definition 5.4. A function E : J × X → {0, 1}m is called a (t, ε)-weak quan-
tum extractor if d(ρE(J,X)B|B) ≤ ε, and a (t, ε)-strong quantum extractor if
d(ρE(J,X)JB|JB) ≤ ε for any normalized ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) which is clas-
sical on HX with X ∈ X and H2(ρXB |B) ≥ t, and where J is uniformly and
independently distributed over J .
Corollary 5.5. For any ε ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ n, there exists a (t, ε)-weak quantum
extractor with n-bit output and seed length ℓ = log |K| = n − t + 2 log(n) +
2 log(1ε ) +O(1).
6 Application II: Private Error Correction
Consider the following scenario. Two parties, Alice and Bob, share a common
secret key K. Furthermore, we assume a “random source” which can be queried
by Alice and Bob so that on identical queries it produces identical outputs. In
particular, when Alice and Bob both query the source on input K, they both
obtain the same “raw key” X ∈ {0, 1}n. We also give an adversary Eve access to
the source. She can obtain some (partial) information on the source and store it
possibly in a quantum state ρZ . However, we assume she has some uncertainty
about X , because due to her ignorance of K, she is unable to extract “the right”
information from the source. Such an assumption of course needs to be justified in
a specific implementation. Specifically, we require that H∞(ρXKZ |KZ) is lower
bounded, i.e., Eve has uncertainty in X even if at some later point she learns K
but only the source has disappeared in the meantime.
Such a scenario for instance arises in the bounded-storage model [19,3] (though
with classical Eve), when K is used to determine which bits of the long random-
izer Alice and Bob should read to obtain X , or in a quantum setting when Alice
sends n qubits to Bob and K influences the basis in which Alice prepares them
respectively Bob measures them.
In this setting, it is well-known how to transform by public (authenticated)
communication the weakly-secure raw key X into a fully secure key S: Alice
and Bob do privacy amplification, as shown in [14,5] in case of a classical Eve,
respectively as in [23,22] in case of a quantum Eve. Indeed, under the above
assumptions on the entropy of X , privacy amplification guarantees that the
resulting key S looks essentially random for Eve even given K. This guarantee
implies that S can be used, say, as a one-time-pad encryption key, but it also
implies that if Eve learns S, she still has essentially no information on K, and
thus K can be safely re-used for the generation of a new key S.
Consider now a more realistic scenario, where due to noise or imperfect mea-
surements Alice’s string X and Bob’s string X ′ are close but not exactly equal.
There are standard techniques to do error correction (without giving Eve too
much information on X): Alice and Bob agree on a suitable error-correcting code
C, Alice samples a random codeword C from C and sends Y = X ⊕ C to Bob,
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who can recover X by decoding C′ = Y ⊕ X ′ to the nearest codeword C and
compute X = Y ⊕ C. Or equivalently, in case of a linear code, Alice can send
the syndrome of X to Bob, which allows Bob to recover X in a similar man-
ner. If Eve’s entropy in X is significantly larger than the size of the syndrome,
then one can argue that privacy amplification still works and the resulting key
S is still (close to) random given Eve’s information (including the syndrome)
and K. Thus, S is still a secure key. However, since X depends on K, and the
syndrome of X depends on X , the syndrome of X may give information on K to
Eve, which makes it insecure to re-use K. A common approach to deal with this
problem is to use part of S as the key K in the next session. Such an approach
not only creates a lot of inconvenience for Alice and Bob in that they now have
to be stateful and synchronized, but in many cases Eve can prevent Alice and
Bob from agreeing on a secure key S (for instance by blocking the last message)
while nevertheless learning information on K, and thus Eve can still cause Alice
and Bob to run out of key material.
In [11], Dodis and Smith addressed this problem and proposed an elegant
solution in case of a classical Eve. They constructed a family of codes which
not only allow to efficiently correct errors, but at the same time also serve as
randomness extractors. More precisely, they show that for every 0 < λ < 1,
there exists a family {Cj}j∈J of binary linear codes of length n, which allows
to efficiently correct a constant fraction of errors, and which is δ-biased for
δ < 2−λn/2. The latter is to be understood that the family {Cj}j∈J of random
variables, where Cj is uniformly distributed over Cj, is δ-biased for δ < 2−λn/2.
Applying Lemma 4 of [11] (the classical version of Theorem 3.2) implies that
Cj⊕X is close to random for anyX with large enough entropy, given j. Similarly,
applying our Theorem 3.2 implies the following.
Theorem 6.1. For every 0 < λ < 1 there exists a family {Cj}j∈J of binary
linear codes of length n which allows to efficiently correct a constant fraction
of errors, and such that for any density matrix ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB) which is
classical on HX with X ∈ {0, 1}n and H2(ρXB|B) ≥ t, it holds that
d
(
ρ(CJ⊕X)BJ
∣∣BJ) ≤ 2− t−(1−λ)n2 ,
where J is uniformly distributed over J and CJ is uniformly distributed over
CJ .
Using a random code from such a family of codes allows to do error correction
in the noisy setting described above without leaking information on K to Eve:
By the chain rule [22, Sect. 3.1.3], the assumed lower bound on H∞(ρXKZ |KZ)
implies a lower bound on H∞(ρXSKZG|SKZG) (essentially the original bound
minus the bit length of S), where G is the randomly chosen universal hash func-
tion used to extract S from X . Combining systems S,K,Z and G into system
B, Theorem 6.1 implies that ρ(CJ⊕X)SKZGJ ≈ 12n1 ⊗ ρSKZGJ . From standard
privacy amplification follows that ρSKZGJ ≈ 12ℓ1⊗ ρKZGJ . Using the indepen-
dence of K,G, J (from Z and from each other), we obtain ρ(CJ⊕X)SKZGJ ≈
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2n1 ⊗ 12ℓ1 ⊗ ρK ⊗ ρZ ⊗ ρG ⊗ ρJ . This in particular implies that S is a secure
key (even when K is given to Eve) and that K is still “fresh” and can be safely
re-used (even when S is additionally given to Eve).
Specifically, our private-error-correction techniques allow to add robustness
against noise to the bounded-storage model in the presence of a quantum attacker
as considered in [17], without the need for updating the common secret key. The
results of [17] guarantee that the min-entropy of the sampled substring is lower
bounded given the attacker’s quantum information and hence, security follows as
outlined above. Furthermore, in [7] the above private-error-correction technique
is an essential ingredient to add robustness against noise but also to protect
against man-in-the-middle attacks in new quantum-identification and quantum-
key-distribution schemes in the bounded-quantum-storage model.
In the language of extractors, we get the following result for arbitrary, not
necessarily efficiently decodable, binary linear codes.
Corollary 6.2. Let {Cj}j∈J be a δ-biased family of binary linear [n, k, d]2-codes.
For any j ∈ J , let Gj be a generator matrix for the code Cj and let Hj be a
corresponding parity-check matrix. Then E : J × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−k, (j, x) 7→
Hjx is a (t, ε)-strong quantum extractor with ε = δ · 2 12 (n−t).
This result gives rise to new privacy-amplification techniques, beyond using
universal2 hashing as in [23] or one-bit extractors as in [18]. Note that using
arguments from [11], it is easy to see that the condition that {Cj}j∈J is δ-biased
and thus the syndrome function Hj is a good strong extractor, is equivalent
to requiring that {Gj}j∈J seen as family of (encoding) functions is δ2-almost
universal2 [30,28].
For a family of binary linear codes {Cj}j∈J , another equivalent condition for
δ-bias of {Cj}j∈J is to require that for all non-zero α, Prj∈J [α ∈ C⊥j ] ≤ δ2,
i.e. that the probability that α is in the dual code of Cj is upper bounded by δ2
[11]. It follows that the family size |J | has to be exponential in n to achieve an
exponentially small bias δ and therefore, the seed length log |J | of the strong
extractor will be linear in n as for the case of two-universal hashing.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a new technique for randomness extraction in the presence of a
quantum attacker. This is interesting in its own right, as up to date only very few
extractors are known to be secure against quantum adversaries, much in contrast
to the classical non-quantum case. The new randomness-extraction technique
has various cryptographic applications like entropically secure encryption, in
the classical bounded-storage model and the bounded-quantum-storage model,
and in quantum key distribution. Furthermore, because of the wide range of
applications of classical extractors not only in cryptography but also in other ar-
eas of theoretical computer science, we feel that our new randomness-extraction
technique will prove to be useful in other contexts as well.
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A Proof of Lemma 4.1
Concerning the first claim,
F(M ∗N)(α) = 1
2n/2
∑
x
(−1)α·x
∑
y
M(y)N(x⊕ y)
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= 2−n/2
∑
y
(−1)α·yM(y)
∑
x
(−1)α·(x⊕y)N(x⊕ y)
= 2−n/2
∑
y
(−1)α·yM(y)
∑
z
(−1)α·zN(z)
= 2n/2 · F(M)(α) · F(N)(α) .
The second claim is argued as follows.
|||F(M)|||22 = tr
(∑
α
F(M)(α)†F(M)(α)
)
= 2−n tr
(∑
α
(∑
x
(−1)α·xM(x)
)∗(∑
x′
(−1)α·x′M(x′)
))
= 2−n tr
(∑
x,x′
M(x)†M(x′)
∑
α
(−1)α·(x⊕x′)
)
= tr
(∑
x
M(x)†M(x)
)
= |||M |||22
where the last equality follows from the fact that
∑
α(−1)α·y = 2n if y =
(0, . . . , 0) and 0 otherwise. ⊓⊔
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